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INTRODUCTION 
This matter arises from the Court of Appeals' Memorandum of Decision 
affirming the Trial Court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
which Appellant brought pursuant to Rule 60b of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Memorandum Decision was rendered on the 7th day of September, 1994. The 
Memorandum Decision affirming the Trial Court's denial of the Appellate's 60b Motion 
did not award to the Appellee costs or fees incurred in the appeal. Appellee has 
requested a Petition for a Rehearing on the specific issue of awarding those fees. 
Appellee apparently filed with the Court on September 12th, 1994 a Motion for 
Extension of Time to respond to the summary disposition, which Motion the Court 
granted on September 15th, 1994, granting the parties until September 26th, 1994 
to respond to the Notice of Consideration of Summary Disposition. Appellants have 
never received the Appellee's September 12th Motion requesting additional time, 
however Appellant did receive on September 22nd, 1994 the Appellee's Motion to 
Extend Filing of Petition for Rehearing and a Petition for Reconsideration, which was 
received in an unbound form on the 18th day of September, 1994, then followed in 
bound form on the 23rd day of September, 1994. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant objects to the request of Appellee that he be awarded attorneys fees 
incurred in defending the appeal filed by Appellant of the Trial Court's denial of 
Appellant's 60b Motion for the reason that Appellee has failed to establish a legal 
basis for awarding of fees, which Appellee alleges should be awarded on one of the 
following theories: 
1 . That the appeal, as fi led, was frivolous, or 
2. That the appeal was brought for the purposes of delay, or 
3. That a contract between the parties provided for attorneys fees, and 
4 . That Petitioner was awarded attorneys fees at the trial level. 
Appellant contends that the appeal is and was justif ied, raised valid issues of 
fact and law for review by the Court. Appellant's assertion that this action is founded 
upon a contract directly contradicts the facts asserted at the trial level. Appellee, 
throughout the discovery process and beyond alleged the contract between the parties 
was oral. 
Appellant further asserts that Appellee has not complied wi th Rule 24A(9) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which requires the Appellant to set forth the 
contentions and reasons of the appeal wi th respect to the issues presented, wi th 
citations to the authorities, statutes and the parts of the record relied upon, the 
Appellee has not done this, but merely made a one paragraph plea as part of its 
petition. 
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Further, contrary to the assertion of the Appellee/Petitioner herein the Trial 
Court denied the request for award of attorneys fees on the specific issue which is the 
subject of this appeal, the denial of the Motion to Set Aside Default. 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Appellant/Respondent requests that the 
Court deny the Appellee/Petitioner's request for a modification of the Memorandum 
Decision to include an award of attorneys fees. That the Appellant/Respondent herein 
be awarded costs and fees for that portion of the appeal pertaining to the Petition for 
Rehearing, inasmuch as the assertions made by Petitioner/Appellee herein are 
fallacious, not supported by the record, and in all respects violates of Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT/RESPONDENT'S APPEAL IS NOT FRIVOLOUS, BROUGHT FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF DELAY, OR IN VIOLATION OF RULE 33 OR 34 OF THE RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Appellant objects to the request of Appellee that he be awarded attorneys fees 
in defending this Appeal for the reason that the appeal was not frivolous or brought 
for the purpose of delay. 
The Appellee, in its Petition for Rehearing asserts that the appeal, as filed, was 
both frivolous and done for the purpose of delay. Rule 33A of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure allows for an award of costs and fees and may include an order 
of double costs if the appeal is deemed to be frivolous. A frivolous appeal is defined 
by the Rule as, 
3 
"An appeal, motion, brief or other paper which is one that 
is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based upon a good faith argument to extend to or 
modify a reverse existing law." 
"Delay" is likewise defined by Rule 33 as, 
"A motion or brief filed for an improper purpose, such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in costs, litigation or gain 
time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief or other paper." 
It is a well settled principle of Utah Law that sanctions for the bringing of an 
appeal, 
"... should only be applied in egregious cases, less there be 
an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower 
court decisions." 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah App. 1988) 
The Porco reasoning and holding has been affirmed by a long littney of cases and 
authorities, to included Hincklevv. Hincklev, 81 5 P.2d 1352; 167 Utah Adv. Rept. 16, 
and Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465; 123 Utah Adv. Rept. 31 . 
The Appellee apparently wishes this Court to adopt a position that because the 
Court of Appeals intends to affirm the trial court's decision that it follow inter alia, that 
the appeal was "frivolous" or "brought for delay." The Utah Supreme Court, in the 
case of Wasatch Bank vs. Leanv, 727 P.2d 633; 44 Utah Adv. Rept. 22, at 23, in 
which it offered a trial court's award of a deficiency judgment that, 
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"Even when an appeal is without merit, it does not follow 
that it was 'frivolous' or brought 'for delay'". 
(At page 23) 
In the case of Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193; 188 Utah Adv. Rept. 26 at 29, 
quoting from Hinckley, stated, 
"However, an unsuccessful appeal which has some merit is 
not frivolous." 
The Appellant/Respondent herein, in its Appellate Memorandum, set forth a 
littney of cases and rulings which appellant contends reasonably supported its 
assertion that the trial Court erred in denying the Motion to Set Aside Default. The 
appeal to this Court is properly taken based upon the existing law of the State of Utah 
and a good faith argument to extend that law. In so filing its appeal, the Appellant 
specifically has complied with Rule 33. 
Appellant/Respondent cites the case of Darrinaton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 
(Utah App. 1992) apparently for the purpose of asserting that because the Appellant 
was involved in another case involving a Motion to set Aside a Judgment, which 
motion was filed not by Wade but by Plaintiff establishes a pattern and practice with 
the Appellant. That case is differentiated from the case at bar for the reason that the 
issues were different the attorney representing Mr. Wade in that proceeding was 
different and the facts were different. Appellee's assertion that Mr. Wade has delayed 
these proceedings throughout the trial process belies the facts. It was Mr. Wade who 
filed not just one, but two Certifications of Readiness of Trial, and had pushed this 
case to the setting of a trial date. Mr. Wade had at all times after the setting aside 
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of the initial Default Judgment moved for an early and expeditious trial on the merits, 
believing that not only the facts but the existing case law supported his position. 
(Certificates of Readiness of Trial, Exhibits A and B.) 
II. THE APPELLEE/PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 24A(9) OF 
THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Rule 24A(9) requires that, 
"An argument shall contain contentions and reasons of 
Appellant with respect to issues presented with citations to 
authority, statutes and parts of record relied upon." 
The Appellee, in its Motion for Summary Disposition, merely asserts his opinion 
that the Appellant was not entitled to appeal the trial Court's denial of Appellant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default, but fails to cite either case law or facts in the record to 
support such an assertion. Instead, Appellee choose to factually misstate the Trial 
Court record, alleging that the Trial Court awarded fees on this issue. The appeal by 
Appellant is not of the Court's Default Order, but of the Trial Court's denial of the 
Motion to Set Aside that default. The Trial Court specifically found that the filing of 
the 60b Motion was proper, both in time and in substance, and that the arguments 
raised by counsel had merit, and on that basis refused to award the Appellee his 
requested costs and fees from which the Appellee has appealed. (Notice of Appeal, 
Exhibit C) This Court, when dealing with a similar request in the case of Hinckley 
v. Hinckley, 81 5 P.2d 1352, denied the request of Appellee that she be awarded her 
costs and fees, she alleged she was entitled to under Rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, when it found, 
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"However, her brief contains only one sentence regarding 
attorneys fees and costs, without citations to the record, 
no legal authorities, and no analysis whatsoever... A mere 
request in the brief, or assertion by counsel at hearing does 
not satisfy this requirement." 
This Court concluded that, 
"Due to the non-compliance with our briefing rule, we 
decline to address this issue[.]" 
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 81 5 P.2d 1352; 167 Utah Adv. Rept. 
16 
English v. Standard Optical, 164 Utah Adv. Rept. 41 at 44, 
(Utah App. 1991) 
In the case at hand, the Appellee/Petitioner, in a single paragraph makes a bare 
demand that he is entitled to an award of costs and fees without citation or authority, 
or facts supported by the record. The unsupported, unfounded and factually wrong 
assertions include: 
"A. The Appellant failed to file an Answer to a properly 
served Complaint and Summons." 
The Court's record will reflect that an Answer has been filed in this case. 
"B. That there was a meritless attempt to set aside the 
Judgment." 
The Trial Court found that the filing of the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was 
properly filed by the Appellant and there was merit to the arguments raised by the 
Appellant. It was upon this foundation that the Trial Court denied Appellee's request 
for costs and fees and that the Appellant had delayed the trial proceedings. The fact 
is, Appellant/Respondent herein was the party who certified the matter ready for trial 
and aggressively sought a trial on the merits. Appellant did fail to appear at trial for 
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the reason that both the Appellant and his counsel mistakenly believed the trial had 
been continued. 
III. APPELLEE ASSERTS THAT A WRITTEN CONTRACT EXISTS BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES, AND THAT THE CONTRACT SUPPORTS AN AWARD OF FEES. 
The Appellee, throughout the period of discovery in all pleadings, at the time 
of trial, and in post-trial motions has consistently asserted that the contract between 
the parties was an oral contract. The Appellee, in its Substitute Memorandum in 
opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default (Exhibit D), which Appellee was 
required to file in order to correct false and misleading statements of material fact 
which had been asserted in the original Memorandum continued to claim the 
Agreement was oral. In fact, the Appellee, in the Substitute Memorandum's 
Statement of Facts which was filed in January of 1994 (Exhibit E), specifically states: 
"That in or about July of 1989, Defendants engaged 
Plaintiff as their agent to attempt to obtain a reduction in 
real property tax liability assessed against a large apartment 
complex consisting of 108 units owned by the Defendants 
and located at approximately 2351 East 6895 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
Paragraph 7 
That the engagement was an oral agreement whereby 
Defendants agreed to only pay Plaintiff in the event that 
Plaintiff was successful in reducing the tax liability for the 
property in question..." 
Paragraph 8 
Appellee now asserts the existence of a written contract which Appellee asserts 
entitles him to an award of costs and fees. The record will reflect that this dispute 
and involved an alleged contract for the reduction of property taxes on the property 
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is located at 2351 East 6895 South in Salt Lake City. (Plaintiff's Complaint, 
paragraphs 5 and 6, and Statement of Facts, Exhibit F, Paragraph 7.) 
There is no dispute that the parties had in the past contracted between 
themselves for services relating to a reduction in property taxes on other parcels of 
property. The Appellant contends, however, that there is not, and was not, a contract 
or agreement on the property located at 2351 East 6895 South, which is the subject 
of this suit. The contract which Appellee attaches to its Petition for Rehearing is on 
its face for properties other than the property which is the subject of this suit. 
Although the copy of the contract attached to the copy of the Appellee's petition 
delivered to Appellant is not the clearest of copies, appears to identify subject 
properties at 2335 East 7000 South and 261 South 800 East in Salt Lake City, Utah 
(Exhibit G). Neither property corresponds to the address of the property which is set 
forth in Plaintiff's Complaint. The assertion by the Appellee that this contract is for 
the property which is the subject of this suit is fallacious and operates as a fraud upon 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellee has failed to establish a legal or factual basis for the awarding of 
costs and fees which would support his request for a modification of the 
Memorandum Decision to include an award of fees. Specifically, 
A. That Appellee is entitled to an award of fees for the reason that there 
was an award of fees at the trial level. The Trial Court specifically 
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denied Appellee's request for costs or fees related to the Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment which is the basis for this appeal. 
B. That the contract which Appellee attaches to its Petition is for two 
specific and distinct pieces of property, none of which are the subject of 
this suit. 
C. That the Appellee has failed to properly brief the issue as required by 
Rule 24A(9) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Appellant is entitled to an award of costs and fees. The Appellee's Request for 
Rehearing on the matter of attorneys fees was done pure and simply to increase the 
costs of this litigation in the hopes of extracting further remuneration from the 
Appellant and is not properly founded upon existing case law, statutes or supported 
by the facts, and in and of itself constitutes a violation of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, entitling the Appellant to an award of attorneys fees and 
double costs which he has been required to incur in responding and replying to the 
Petition for Rehearing. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant/Respondent requests that this Court deny the Petition 
of Appellee to award fees and double costs, and for an Order sanctioning Appellee for 
the filing of the Petition, and awarding the Appellant reasonable fees and costs which 
he has been required to return in responding to the frivoJ£ftj^r petit ion. 
DATED this 26th day of September^JL9S4^. 
rii_cLS 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 8 1994 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT 
Appellee/Petitioner, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. 
WADE, 
Appellants/Respondent. 
Appeal No. 940339-CA 
Trial Court No. 920012860CV 
Priority No. 1 5 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Appellants/Respondent's 
Reply to Petition for Rehearing was mailed, via first class mail, to attorney for the 
appellee/Petitioner, M. Shane Smith/Douglas R. Short, 311 South State Street, Suite 
450, Salt Lake City Utah 84111 , on the 27th day of September, 1994. 
DATED this 27th day of September, 1994. 
/*»•". James I. Watts 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this^3_ day of September, 1994, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Certificate of Service was mailed via first class mail, postage 
pre-paid to: 
M. Shane Smith 
Douglas R. Short 
Smith & Hanna 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ii 
Exhibit A 
JAMES I. WATTS (#4768) 
Attorney for Defendants 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 533-8505 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. 
WADE, 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATION OF READINESS 
FOR TRIAL 
Civil No. 920012860CV 
Judge Fuchs 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT: 
James I. Watts, attorney for Defendants, by his signature 
below hereby certifies that in his judgment this case is ready for 
trial and in support of such certification counsel represents to 
the Court as follows: 
1. That all required pleadings have been filed and the case 
is at issue as to all parties. 
i 2. That counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing 
, counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that all 
i 
I! discovery of record has been completed. 
3. That if medical testimony is contemplated or required, 
copies of all existing medical reports have been available to all 
counsel or parties of record. 
4. That there are no Motions that have been filed which 
remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made. 
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have been 
pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement has been 
affected. (Such discussions are to be realistic in nature and not 
limited to an unresponded to offer. The duty to affectively 
negotiate lies with all parties.) 
6. Request is hereby made that this matter be set for the 
earliest possible trial date. 
Counsel further certifies that the following counsel or pro se 
parties of record were furnished with a copy of this Certificate on 
the / "3 day of August, 1993 whose last known addresses and 
telephone numbers are as follows: 
NAME ADDRESS 
Charles Hanna Smith & H^nna 
175 E^WOO S 
Salt ^ Lake Ci 
Wai 
fney for defendants 
124 So. 600 E., Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES 
Any objections to the above certification or any disagreement to 
any of the matters to certified are to filed in writing with the 
Court within ten (10) days of the date hereof, served upon all 
parties, and will be heard at the scheduling conference. 
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Exhibit B 
*— [01 S \ %>J 
JAMES I. WATTS (#4768) 
Attorney for Defendants 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801) 533-8505 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
1
 ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT 
|i Plaintiff, 
'' vs. 
, STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. 
,! WADE, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED CERTIFICATION OF 
READINESS FOR TRIAL 
Civil No. 920012860CV 
Judge Fuchs 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT: 
James I. Watts, attorney for Defendants, by his signature 
below hereby certifies that in his judgment this case is ready for 
trial and in support of such certification counsel represents to 
the Court as follows: 
1. That all required pleadings have been filed and the case 
is at issue as to all parties. 
2. That counsel has completed all discovery; that opposing 
counsel have had reasonable time to pursue discovery; and that all 
discovery of record has been completed. 
3. That if medical testimony is contemplated or required, 
copies of all existing medical reports have been available to all 
counsel or parties of record. 
4. That there are no Motions that have been filed which 
remain pending and upon which no disposition has been made. 
5. That reasonable discussions to effect settlement have been 
pursued by counsel and their clients but no settlement has been 
affected. (Such discussions are to be realistic in nature and not 
limited to an unresponded to offer. The duty to affectively 
negotiate lies with all parties.) 
6. Request is hereby made that this matter be set for the 
earliest possible trial date. 
Counsel further certifies that the following counsel or pro se 
parties of record were furnished with a copy of this Certificate on 
the Z^ ^ day of August, 1993 whose last known addresses and 
telephone numbers are as follows: 
NAME 
Charles Hanna 
ADDRESS 
Smith & Hanna 
311 So. Stats #45 
S a l t Lc^ee >efityf U^ah g * H l 
PHONE 
52 
^Watts 
:or Dei 
5b. 600 E . , / S u i t e 100 
felt Lake C i t y , UT 84102 
?elephone: (801) 533-8505 
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES 
j Any objections to the above certification or any disagreement to 
i 
any of the matters to certified are to filed in writing with the 
1
 Court within ten (10) days of the date hereof, served upon all 
parties, and will be heard at the scheduling conference. 
Exhibit C 
M. Shane Smith (3007) 
Douglas R. Short (5344) 
SMITH & HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South state Street, Suite 450 
Sale Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE, 
Defendants. 
Civil NO.920012860CV 
Judge Fuchs 
Notice is hereby given that plaintiff and appellant, 
Robert Mabey, by and through his attorneys, M. Shane Smith and 
Douglas R. Short of Smith & Hanna, P.C, appeals to the Utah Court 
of Appeals the final judgment of the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs 
entered in this matter on June 6, 1994. 
The appeal is taken from that portion of the judgment 
denying plaintiff/appellant an award of attorney's fees. 
DATED this f day of July, 1994. 
SMITH & HANNA 
IS R. 
Attdrney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify on the ^ day of July, 1994, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed first 
class, postage pre-paid, to the following; 
James I. Watts 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
IISSWOTA*U>M 
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Exhibit D 
Charles W. Hanna (1326) 
M. Shane Smith (3007) 
Douglas R. Short (5344) 
SMITH Sc HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTITUTE 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Civil NO.920012860CV 
Judge Fuchs 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Robert Mabey, by and through his 
attorneys, M. Shane Smith of Smith & Hanna, P.C., and hereby 
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for Stay of Execution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is defendants' second attempt to set aside a 
judgment in this matter, the first having been a default previously 
entered by this Court and subsequently set aside. 
2. The present judgment was entered by this Court on 
November 3, 1993, after this matter came before the Court at the 
time regularly set for trial on the 3rd of November, 1993, at the 
hour of 9:30 a.m., before the Honorable Dennis Fuchs, Judge, 
Plaintiff being present and represented by counsel, M. Shane Smith 
of Smith & Hanna, Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, 
failing to appear and no one appearing as counsel, the Court having1 
waited in excess of 15 minutes for Defendants' appearance and 
noting that notice had been delivered to James I. Watts, attorney 
of record, of the date, time and place set for trial, the Court 
having reviewed the file and record in this matter and good cause 
appearing therefore, ordered that defendants' answer be stricken 
and judgment was entered against defendants, and each of them, in 
favor of plaintiff, in the amount of $2,462.15, together with said 
plaintiff's costs and disbursements in the amount of $134.00, plus 
interest prior to judgment at the rate of ten percent (10%) in the 
amount of $1,165.71; further that attorney's fees be awarded to 
plaintiff in the total amount of $2405.86, and that the total 
amount of the judgment is and shall be $6033.72. It was further 
ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said 
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit, and that pursuant to Section 15-1-4, Utah Code Anno., 
1953, as amended, interest accrue after judgment in the amount of 
two points over the federal post judgment interest rate. 
3. Defendants now seek to set aside the November 3, 
1993 judgment, claiming mistake or excusable neglect arising from 
counsel's claim that he directed his temporary secretary to enter 
motions for continuance in two separate cases with similar 
captions, and the secretary purportedly placed the wrong caption on 
the motion for the instant case and sent it to the wrong court and 
- 2 -
the wrong attorney. 
4. Counsel for defendants never contacted plaintiff's 
counsel in this case to give notice of the motion, or to seek a 
continuance, or to follow up on the motion for continuance. See 
affidavit of M. Shane Smith. 
5. Counsel for defendants never contacted James Lund, 
counsel for defendants Doug and Bruce Mabey in the case where the 
motion was mistakenly filed, to request a continuance or to 
schedule another trial date. 
6. As to the factual background of this case, plaintiff 
incorporates the facts set forth in plaintiff's original Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' first Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. 
7. In or about July 1989, defendants engaged plaintiff 
as their agent to attempt to obtain a reduction in real property 
tax liability assessed against a large apartment complex consisting 
of 108 units owned by defendants, and located at approximately 2351 
East 6895 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Affidavit of Robert Mabey 
filed with the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Renewed Motion To Set Aside Judgment as Exhibit "A" (hereinafter 
"Mabey Affidavit"), at paragraph 2. 
8. The engagement was an oral agreement whereby 
defendants agreed to only pay plaintiff in the event that plaintiff 
was successful in reducing the tax liability for the property in 
question, and to the extent successful, defendants agreed to pay to 
plaintiff one-half (1/2) of all reduction in tax liability for the 
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first year of savings. (Mabey Affidavit, 3.) 
9. Plaintiff did obtain a hearing before the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization and was successful in obtaining a 
reduction in the assessed property tax which resulted in a savings 
to defendants for tax year 1989 in the amount of Four Thousand Nine 
Hundred Twenty-Four and 30/100 Dollars ($4,924.30). (Mabey 
Affidavit at 5.) 
10. Defendants had entered into a separate agreement on 
a separate piece of property which, although the work was of a 
similar nature, the appeal was separate and distinct from the 
present matter. Plaintiff had already been successful in obtaining 
a reduction in tax liability in that separate appeal involving the 
other piece of property. (Mabey Affidavit at 8.) 
11. As in the present case, defendants accepted the 
benefit of plaintiff's work but denied any contractual obligation 
to pay the one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings to plaintiff 
as agreed. Plaintiff was forced to bring suit to obtain the funds 
owed, which suit was successful. After trial to the bench (Judge 
McCleve), defendants were ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of 
one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings obtain on that separate 
property. (See Mabey v. Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade. Civil 
No. 913007821CV, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake 
City Department.) 
12. In the prior case, the Court expressly found that 
Mabey had entered into an oral contract to attempt to effect a 
reduction of property taxes on the specific single piece of 
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property known as the Del Monico apartments. (See Judge McCleve's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment attached hereto 
as Exhibit "B" (hereinafter "McCleve Findings") at paragraph 1 of 
the Findings.) 
13. The oral contract between defendants and plaintiff 
in the prior case was expressly found to be limited to the Del 
Monico property. (McCleve Findings at paragraph 1.) 
14. In the prior case, Judge McCleve expressly found 
that defendant's, Stanley Wade, claim concerning the reduction in 
tax liability had been accomplished by himself to not be credible 
in that defendant, Stanley Wade, was ignorant not only of the 
procedure necessary to pursue a reduction in real property tax, but 
he did not even know which agency heard such claims. (McCleve 
Findings at paragraph 5.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants neglect was not excusable. 
There was no mistake in this case. Defense counsel had 
clear notice as to when the trial was scheduled. The only question 
is whether counsel's clear negligence in failing to properly file 
the motion for continuance was excusable. 
The burden is on defendants to show why their neglect was 
excusable, and yet, they present absolutely no argument for why the 
negligence should be excused. They only explain how the negligent 
filing occurred. 
A motion for continuance, standing alone, does not 
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continue a trial date. At best, it merely serves notice that 
counsel would not be at trial. For counsel to merely assume that 
a trial date will be continued without even attempting to contact 
the court to confirm the continuance, or attempting to contact 
opposing counsel to obtain an agreement to continue, is not 
excusable. 
Defense counsel had notice of the trial date, and his 
personal conflict therewith, for almost a month before he left the 
country, and yet he made absolutely no attempt to contact opposing 
counsel to arrange a continuance. Such a contact would have 
required a minimal amount of effort. It could have even been 
delegated to a staff person. Had such an effort been made, the 
error in the filing would have been detected and the nonappearance 
could have been avoided. 
The unavailability of defendants' counsel was not an 
emergency or a surprise. Defendants' counsel knew for over a year 
that he would not be available from October 17th to November 7th. 
The whole conflict could have therefore been avoided had defense 
counsel simply noted in the certificate of readiness for trial that 
he would be unavailable during the period he would be out of the 
country. Counsel made no such effort. Since defense counsel did 
not take even the most minimal amount of effort to ensure that the 
trial would be continued, his subsequent negligence in filing his 
motion with the wrong court and the wrong opposing counsel should 
not be excused. 
This is the second judgment that plaintiff has obtained 
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against the defendants due to defendants lack of diligence in 
defending this matter. Plaintiff should no longer be required to 
suffer for defendants misconduct. 
II. Defendants have not established a credible 
meritorious defense. 
A. Defendants have waived any claim 
that the doctrine of res judicata 
precludes this action. 
Res Judicata is an affirmative defense which must be 
raised in a defendant's answer or be waived. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 8(c), and 12(h). Defendants in this case did not raise 
the defense of res judicata in their Answer and are therefore 
barred from raising it at this time. Res judicata therefore is not 
a meritorious defense. 
B. Defendants' claim that the doctrine 
of res judicata acts to preclude 
this action is not well founded. 
Even if res judicata is not considered to be waived, it 
does not apply in this case. In the prior case upon which 
defendants rely, Judge McCleve expressly entered a finding that the 
contract in question, in the case before her, specifically related 
to the Del Monico apartment properties. The case at bar involves 
a completely separate contract for a separate piece of property, 
the Hillside Apartments. The acts necessary to discharge 
plaintiffs' obligations to fulfill the terms of the contract 
presently before the court are completely separate, and indeed 
required a separate filing before the Board of Equalization, and 
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resulted in a separate benefit to defendants. Judge McCleve 
entered specific findings that the property involved was the Del 
Monico apartment property. The work done by plaintiff, relative to 
the Del Monico apartment property, was separate and apart from the 
work done on the Hillside apartment complex property, and indeed 
required filing, pursuing and prosecuting a totally separate appeal 
before the Board of Equalization. From the McCleve Findings, it is 
clear that the prior case was a separate cause of action. 
Consequently, res judicata does not apply as to the separate 
contractual claim being raised for the first time in this suit. 
Defendants' nevertheless assert that plaintiff is barred 
from bringing the present cause of action because it should have 
been brought in the first lawsuit. Since the contracts are 
separate, any claim plaintiff had in relation to the subject 
property of this case would have been a permissive claim in the 
first suit. Defendants have not presented any law requiring 
plaintiff to file both claims in a single suit. 
C. Defendants' claim that no services 
were performed with regard to the 
subject property of this suit is 
without merit. 
Defendants assert that plaintiff and defendants did not enter 
into a contract whereby plaintiff would appeal defendants' property 
valuation. Defendants assert further that plaintiff performed no 
services with regard to the subject property of this suit. The 
appeal filed with the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization on the 
valuation of the subject property, a copy of which is attached 
hereto as exhibit nC,ff clearly identifies Robert Mabey as the party 
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who filed the appeal as the agent of defendants- It is undisputed 
that defendants received the benefit of the appeal filed by 
plaintiff in that their taxes were in fact reduced. It is 
therefore clear that defendants have no meritorious defense on the 
merits of plaintiff's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, plaintiff reiterates his position that 
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment should be 
denied because the neglect was inexcusable, and because defendants 
do not have any meritorious defense. 
Defendants' motion is meritless and brought in bad faith. 
Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests legal fees for defending 
against it. 
DATED this day of January, 1994. 
SMITH & HANNA 
By: 
Douglas R. Short 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify on the day of May, 1993, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT was mailed first 
class, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
James I. Watts 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
MSS1MEM0PP1.PA1 
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Charles W. Hanna (1326) 
M. Shane Smith (3007) 
SMITH & HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT MABEY 
Civil No. 920012860CV 
Judge Fuchs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW the Affiant, Robert Mabey, who first being duly 
sworn upon his oath, does depose and state as follows: 
1. Affiant is the Robert Mabey named as the Plaintiff 
in the above-entitled matter. 
2. In or about July 1989, Defendants engaged Affiants' 
services to attempt to effect a reduction in property tax liability 
for a large apartment complex located at approximately 2351 East 
6895 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The terms of the agreement were very simple; Affiant 
agreed to use his best efforts to effect a reduction in property 
taxes on the property and Defendants agreed to pay Affiant one-half 
(1/) of the reduction in tax liability for the year. Because of 
the simple nature of the agreement, it was not reduced to writing. 
Affiant did pursue the appropriate steps required to effect such a 
reduction. 
4. As agent for the Defendants, Affiant filed the 
appropriate documents, obtained the hearing before the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization, and prepared the documents showing 
the value of the property on a capitalization method based on 
rental income and property values by use of comparable properties. 
5. Affiant was successful in obtaining a reduction in 
tax liability for the year 1989 in the amount of $4,924.30. 
Pursuant to the agreement, Affiant is entitled to one-half (1/2) of 
that savings, which amount is $2,462.15. 
6. At all times, Defendants were aware of the efforts 
of Affiant and at no time did Defendants request Affiant to 
discontinue his efforts in pursuing the said reduction in property 
taxes on this property. 
7. Defendants did receive the full benefit of the tax 
reduction on the property located at 2351 East 6895 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, in the amount of $4,924.30. 
8. At approximately the same time, Defendants engaged 
Plaintiff to pursue a reduction in tax liability on a separate 
piece of property known as the Del Monico Apartments. Plaintiff 
was successful there also in effecting a reduction in property tax 
and liability for which Plaintiff received the full benefit of said 
reduction. Defendants were fully aware of Affiant's activities and 
efforts to effect said reduction in tax on the Del Monico 
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Apartments and made no effort to stop Affiant's efforts in pursuing 
such reduction in property taxes on said other piece of property. 
9. Further Affiant sayeth not. 
DATED this / 2- day of March, 1993. 
-u-J 
Robert Mabey 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / 2 r ^ day of 'Zfc 
March, 1993 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary PuWic 
SHARON J. ORTEGA 
364 North 600 VVesc 
Sail Lake City, Uteh t r113 
Lty CoirirnisHon Exo.rc^ 
September 23,1'^JJ 
Staidof UtcJs 
NOTARY PUBL] 
Salt Lake Cc 
^ ^ ~ 
Residing/dt/ 
Utah (y 
MSS1AFFMABEYM1 
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/ 
Charles W. Hanna (1326) 
SMITH & HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC ) 
MANAGEMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE AND JANET B. 
WADE, ; 
Defendants. ' 
) FINDI* 
CONCIrt 
Civil 
I ytfudge 
jGS OF FACT AND 
JSIONS OF LAW 
No. 913007821CV 
Sheila K. McCleve 
This matter having come on regularly before the Court for 
trial on July 17, 1992, the Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, being present 
and being represented by his counsel, Charles W. Hanna of Smith & 
Hanna, and Defendant, Stanley L. Wade, being present and represent-
ing himself, and the Court having heard the evidence in this matter 
and the argument presented by both sides, does hereby enter its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 1989, Defendants, Stanley L. Wade 
and Janet B. Wade, entered into a contract with Robert Mabey doing 
business as Pacific Management pursuant to the terms of which 
Robert Mabey agreed to attempt to get the Wadesf property taxes on 
the Del Monico Apartments reduced and the Wades agreed to pay to 
EXHIBIT B 
•-. r. 
•«'f 
Robert Mabey the sum of one-half (1/2) of the tax savings for the 
first year, 
2. Robert Mabey was able to obtain a reduction on the 
taxes assessed on the Del Monico Apartments from $10,162.85 to 
$7,317.26, a total savings of $2,845.59. 
3. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Robert Mabey 
was entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the total reduction in the 
taxes assessed on the Del Monico Apartments. The total reduction 
was $2,845.59. Robert Mabey was therefore entitled to payment of 
the sum of $1,422.79. 
4. Robert Mabey invoiced the Defendants, Stanley L. Wade 
and Janet B. Wade, for the sum of $1,422.79 but the Wades failed 
and refused to pay to Robert Mabey the sum due and owing. 
5. The Court finds in Mr. Wadefs testimony that he was 
the individual responsible for the reduction of property taxes on 
the Del Monico Apartments is not credible. Mr. Wade was not even 
aware of the procedure necessary to have the property taxes reduced 
on the Del Monico Apartments, nor was Mr. Wade aware of specifical-
ly what entity had ultimately ruled that the taxes on the Del 
Monico Apartments needed to be reduced. 
6. The Court find that in the process initiated by 
Robert Mabey to have the property taxes on the Del Monico Apart-
ments reduced, that Mr. Wade became aware through a telephone call 
from an individual associated with the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization of Mr. Mabeyfs activities to reduce the taxes. Mr. 
Wade took no action to stop Mr. Mabey from attempting to have the 
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taxes reduced on the Del Monico Apartments and received the benefit 
of such reduction. 
7. Defendant, Stanley Wade, did not prove that he ever 
loaned $2,500.00 to Robert Mabey as provided in his Counterclaim. 
8. Stanley Wade did call Robert Mabey and state that he 
had overpaid Robert Mabey the sum of $2,500.00 and that he was 
willing to treat that overpayment as a loan. The Court finds, 
however, that Mr. Mabey had performed the obligations of his 
contract on the Hillside Apartments and become entitled to payment 
of the sum of $2,500.00. The fact that Mr. Wade decided to pursue 
an additional appeal to the Utah State Tax Commission to see if his 
property taxes could be lowered an additional amount, did not 
affect the fact that Mr. Mabey became entitled to fifty percent 
(50%) of the savings that he had obtained on the Hillside Apartment 
property taxes at the level of the Salt Lake County Board of 
Equalization• 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
In addition to the Conclusions of Law implied in the 
Findings of Fact set forth above, the Court finds as follows: 
1. Although the Court specifically finds that there was 
a contract in this case based upon the testimony, the Court further 
finds as a Conclusion of Law that even if a contract did not exist, 
that Robert Mabey would be entitled to judgment on his Complaint 
based upon the doctrine of quantum meruit. 
2. The Defendants failed to meet the burden of proof 
required on the Counterclaim. 
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3. Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment on its Complaint 
in the principal amount of $1,422.79 together with accrued interest 
and court costs. 
4. The Defendants' Counterclaim should be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED this S-
'AJ- f 
'•^S day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, first class, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, this Yo? day of July, 
1992, to: 
Stanley Wade 
2159 Parley's Terrace 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
*&&indite \^ 
-/ 
WP51\CWH\FINDFACT.PA1 
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Charles W. Hanna (1326) 
SMITH & HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE AND JANET B. 
WADE, 
Defendants. 
This matter having come on regularly before the Court for 
trial on July 17, 1992, the Plaintiff, Rdbert Mabey, being present 
and being represented by his counsel, Cnarles W. Hanna of Smith & 
Hanna, and Defendant, Stanley L. Wade, being present and represent-
ing himself and Defendant, Janet B. Wade, having failed to appear 
and the Court having heard the evidence submitted by the parties 
and having heard the argument of counsel for the Plaintiff and 
having heard the argument of Mr. Wade and for good cause having 
been shown: 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reasons of the 
premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, do recover from Defendants, Stanley L. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. /913007821CV 
Judge Sheila K. McCleve 
Wade and Janet B. Wade, the sum of $1,422.79 together with $230.04 
accrued interest and $54.00 court costs. 
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
Defendants' Counterclaim is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
Judgment rendered this ^17 aay of July, 1992. 
Attest my hand as Clerk and the Seal 
of the said Court this day of 
July, 1992. 
, Clerk 
By , Deputy Clerk 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, first class, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT, this J^ r? day of July, 1992, to: 
Stanley Wade 
2159 Parley's Terrace 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
•y 
WP5X\CWH\ JUDGMENT. PA1 
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Exhibit E 
Charles W. Hanna (1326) 
M. Shane Smith (3007) 
Douglas R. Short (5344) 
SMITH & HANNA, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-8900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d/b/a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. WADE, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTITUTE 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
Civil NO.920012860CV 
Judge Fuchs 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Robert Mabey, by and through his 
attorneys, M. Shane Smith of Smith & Hanna, P.C., and hereby 
respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment and Motion for Stay of Execution. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is defendants' second attempt to set aside a 
judgment in this matter, the first having been a default previously 
entered by this Court and subsequently set aside. 
2. The present judgment was entered by this Court on 
November 3, 1993, after this matter came before the Court at the 
time regularly set for trial on the 3rd of November, 1993, at the 
hour of 9:30 a.m., before the Honorable Dennis Fuchs, Judge, 
Plaintiff being present and represented by counsel, M. Shane Smith 
of Smith & Hanna, Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, 
failing to appear and no one appearing as counsel, the Court having 
waited in excess of 15 minutes for Defendants' appearance and 
noting that notice had been delivered to James I. Watts, attorney 
of record, of the date, time and place set for trial, the Court 
having reviewed the file and record in this matter and good cause 
appearing therefore, ordered that defendants' answer be stricken 
and judgment was entered against defendants, and each of them, in 
favor of plaintiff, in the amount of $2,462.15, together with said 
plaintiff's costs and disbursements in the amount of $134.00, plus 
interest prior to judgment at the rate of ten percent (10%) in the 
amount of $1,165.71; further that attorney's fees be awarded to 
plaintiff in the total amount of $2405.86, and that the total 
amount of the judgment is and shall be $6033.72. It was further 
ordered that this judgment shall be augmented in the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting said 
judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit, and that pursuant to Section 15-1-4, Utah Code Anno., 
1953, as amended, interest accrue after judgment in the amount of 
two points over the federal post judgment interest rate. 
3. Defendants now seek to set aside the November 3, 
1993 judgment, claiming mistake or excusable neglect arising from 
counsel's claim that he directed his temporary secretary to enter 
motions for continuance in two separate cases with similar 
captions, and the secretary purportedly placed the wrong caption on 
the motion for the instant case and sent it to the wrong court and 
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the wrong attorney. 
4. Counsel for defendants never contacted plaintiff's 
counsel in this case to give notice of the motion, or to seek a 
continuance, or to follow up on the motion for continuance. See 
affidavit of M. Shane Smith. 
5. Counsel for defendants never contacted James Lund, 
counsel for defendants Doug and Bruce Mabey in the case where the 
motion was mistakenly filed, to request a continuance or to 
schedule another trial date. 
6. As to the factual background of this case, plaintiff 
incorporates the facts set forth in plaintiff's original Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' first Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment. 
7. In or about July 1989, defendants engaged plaintiff 
as their agent to attempt to obtain a reduction in real property 
tax liability assessed against a large apartment complex consisting 
of 108 units owned by defendants, and located at approximately 2351 
East 6895 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Affidavit of Robert Mabey 
filed with the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Renewed Motion To Set Aside Judgment as Exhibit "A" (hereinafter 
"Mabey Affidavit"), at paragraph 2. 
8. The engagement was an oral agreement whereby 
defendants agreed to only pay plaintiff in the event that plaintiff 
was successful in reducing the tax liability for the property in 
question, and to the extent successful, defendants agreed to pay to 
plaintiff one-half (1/2) of all reduction in tax liability for the 
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first year of savings. (Mabey Affidavit, 3.) 
9. Plaintiff did obtain a hearing before the Salt Lake 
County Board of Equalization and was successful in obtaining a 
reduction in the assessed property tax which resulted in a savings 
to defendants for tax year 1989 in the amount of Four Thousand Nine 
Hundred Twenty-Four and 30/100 Dollars ($4,924.30). (Mabey 
Affidavit at 5.) 
10. Defendants had entered into a separate agreement on 
a separate piece of property which, although the work was of a 
similar nature, the appeal was separate and distinct from the 
present matter. Plaintiff had already been successful in obtaining 
a reduction in tax liability in that separate appeal involving the 
other piece of property. (Mabey Affidavit at 8.) 
11. As in the present case, defendants accepted the 
benefit of plaintiff's work but denied any contractual obligation 
to pay the one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings to plaintiff 
as agreed. Plaintiff was forced to bring suit to obtain the funds 
owed, which suit was successful. After trial to the bench (Judge 
McCleve), defendants were ordered to pay to plaintiff the sum of 
one-half (1/2) of the tax liability savings obtain on that separate 
property. (See Mabey v. Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade. Civil 
No. 913007821CV, Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County, Salt Lake 
City Department.) 
12. In the prior case, the Court expressly found that 
Mabey had entered into an oral contract to attempt to effect a 
reduction of property taxes on the specific single piece of 
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Exhibit F 
Charles W. Hanna (1326) (pI^ £ D 
SMITH & HANNA, P.C. ' 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f UMWCFPIQ PM U« 21 
311 South S t a t e , S u i t e 450 I33t OLr iu 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 , - q v nF M CIRCUIT COURT 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 8 9 0 0 "sC LAKE Df^MHEnT 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT 
ROBERT MABEY d / b / a PACIFIC 
MANAGEMENT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STANLEY L. WADE and JANET B. 
WADE, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
C i v i l No. 
Judge tfwd/Mia/ 
Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, for cause of action against 
defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, complains and 
alleges as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, is a resident of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and does business in the State of Utah as 
Pacific Management. 
2. Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, are 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. The contract upon which the within causes of action 
are based were entered into and were to have been performed in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Contract 
4. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 1 through 3 as though set forth verbatim herein. 
5. In about July of 1989, defendants, Stanley L. Wade 
and Janet B. Wade, entered into a contract with Robert Mabey doing 
business as Pacific Management pursuant to the terms of which 
Robert Mabey agreed to attempt to get the Wades' property taxes on 
certain property located at 2351 East 6895 South in Salt Lake City, 
Utah reduced, and the Wades agreed to pay Robert Mabey one-half of 
the savings for the first year. 
6. Pacific Management was able to obtain a reduction on 
the taxes assessed against the property located at 2351 East 6895 
South from $26,375.04 to $21,450.74, a total savings of $4,924.30. 
7. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Pacific 
Management was entitled to 50% of the total savings of $4,924.30 as 
payment for its services. Pacific Management is therefore entitled 
to $2,462.15. 
8. Pacific Management has fully complied with all of its 
obligations under the contract and demand has been made upon 
defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, for payment of the 
sum of $2,462.15, but said defendants have failed and refused to 
pay to plaintiff the sum due and owing. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Quantum Meruit 
9. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 8 as though set forth verbatim 
herein. 
10. Plaintiff, Robert Mabey, has provided to defendants 
services in reducing their real property taxes, which are the 
subject matter of this litigation, which has conferred a reasonable 
value upon said defendants. 
11. Plaintiff has acted as alleged herein, with the 
expectation of being compensated therefor in an amount equal to the 
reasonable value of the services provided by plaintiff to 
defendants• 
12. Defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. Wade, owe 
to plaintiff, Robert Mabey, the sum of $2,462.15 to compensate 
plaintiff for the fair and reasonable value of the services 
provided by plaintiff to defendants. 
13. Plaintiff has not acted as a volunteer or an 
intermeddler in conducting himself as alleged herein, and 
defendants at all times have acknowledged the actions of plaintiff 
as conferring a substantial benefit upon them with respect to the 
services rendered in lowering their property taxes. 
14. To permit defendants to retain the benefits received 
from plaintiff without compensating plaintiff therefor would result 
in the unjust enrichment of defendants at the expense of plaintiff, 
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which unjust enrichment should not be countenanced by a court of 
equity. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays the above entitled Court for 
judgment as follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Contract 
1. That plaintiff, Robert Mabey, be awarded a personal 
money judgment against defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. 
Wade, in the amount of $2,462.15, together with prejudgment 
interest at the legal rate and court costs. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Quantum Meruit 
2. That plaintiff, Robert Mabey, be awarded a personal 
money judgment against defendants, Stanley L. Wade and Janet B. 
Wade, in the amount of $2,462.15, together with prejudgment 
interest at the legal rate and court costs. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
equitable and just in the premises. 
DATED this /O^- day of September, 1992. 
Plaintiff's Address: 
2169 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
CWH\COMPLAIN. PA1 
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Exhibit G 
f^k C I F I C M A N A G E M E N T C O R P O R A T I O N 
This agreement is made between WPACIFIC MANAGEMENT CORPORATION" 
(hereafter PMC) and the Owner/s (hereafter Client) of the property 
noted herein. The property to be researched and appealed by PMC. 
is located: 
(property address) (city) (state) (zip) 
The following is agreed by both parties: 
1. Client authorizes PMC to appeal the assessed valuation of 
above property before appropriate government entitles. If PMC 
determined that It may not be beneficial to appeal the Real 
Property taxes of property, PMC at their sole discretion, may elect 
not to proceed with the tax appeal. 
2. Client agrees to pay PMC 50* of the first year savings in Real 
Property Taxes realized by appeal process. Client agrees to pay 
PMC upon written notice of the Tax reduction. Client empowers PMC 
or it's officers with limited power of attorney to act in behalf 
of client in all matters relating to the property tax appeal, 
direction of or disposition of refund, and or collection of any 
compensation due PMC. 
3. Client agrees to hold PMC harmless of any action arising out 
of association with PMC. Client agrees to provide all requested 
documents. In the event of non-payment, Client agrees to pay all 
resulting collection cost, court cost and reasonable attorneys 
fees. 
4. Client agrees to cooperate and provide any and all'assistance, 
information and documentation necessary for PMC to complete the tax 
appeal process, including copies of 1989 NOTICE OF PROPERTY 
VALUATION AND TAX CHANGE and CLOSING STATEMENT if property was 
purchased within the last year, and to complete the following 
section as it may apply by filling out the following: (please 
print) 
-iLJ- y ,~ — V /. '~U- :_...-.' w..ty 
PACIFIC MANAGEMENT T7" 
<*— '-•'. '?:"•• s/'»-rr* }*/**/* 
DATE' . OWNER SIGNATURE 
OWNER 
CITY STATE ZIP 
AREA TELEPHONE 
DATE 
APPROX. DATS PURCHASED 
•stt^/*»» \ ^»-
